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Abstract—We discuss the problem of a secure login to a virtu-
alized workstation. For increased security, the workstation’s
hard drive is encrypted. During the startup, a decryption
password to the drive must be entered by a user. We pro-
pose a solution that involves mutual authentication between
the workstation and the user and ensures the password may
be entered securely.
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1. Introduction
Our work is a part of a project aiming at a development
of a virtualization-based secure workstation, designed for
running classified software or processing sensitive data.
An important component of the overall security is hard
drive encryption (portable media encryption is considered
as well). Also, a workstation may be regarded as secure
only if it runs original, unmodified software. Assuring this
is easier in a physically protected environment; in case of
portable computers, however, it poses a challenging prob-
lem. In the paper, we propose a solution that allows to
combine hard drive encryption with a trustful boot process,
preventing risk of software tampering.
The paper is organized as follows: First, we briefly describe
the project. Then, we overview drive encryption software.
The subsequent part of the paper defines the problem of
secure logon, and discusses the boot process in details.
We assess the security level offered by our solution, then
propose further work and end the paper with conclusions.
2. Secure Station for Special
Applications
The work described in the paper has been performed as
a part of Secure Workstation for Special Applications1
project, implemented by a consortium of four companies
(the Military University of Technology, the Research and
Academic Computer Network (NASK), Filbico, and the
Military Communication Institute). The project’s goal is
1The project “Secure Workstation for Special Applications” has been
founded by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education under
grant no. 0140/R/T00/2010/11.
to develop a virtualization-based workstation, designed for
special applications. It is assumed that each virtual ma-
chine (except for the “control” domain 0) processes data
from a different domain – by ”data domain” we understand
either a classification level (unclassified, restricted, etc.) or
a purpose (e.g., a financial system, a human resources sys-
tem, an IT software project), and because of that the data
and related processing activities should be separated. This
separation, together with increased security, provided by
a hypervisor, is the most important reason for the selection
of a virtualized environment.
By “special applications” of a workstation we mean its typ-
ical use in a classified system, e.g., in a chancellery for
storing sensitive documents or as a machine for running
classified software. While the focus of the project is put on
desktop workstations, we also consider mobile computers
(laptops). At this stage of the project, we do not con-
sider networking (and related security risks). Generally,
we silently assume the workstation is a standalone system.
After a review of open-source hypervisors that could be
employed by the project, the consortium members selected
Xen [1] (the version is 4.1). KVM [2] was another strong
candidate. The final decision was made mainly on the basis
of market presence and the significance of research projects
related to each of the two hypervisors, and we believe in
these two areas Xen evidently prevails.
3. Drive Encryption for Linux
The Linux distribution used in project is RedHat Enter-
prise 6.1. The default encryption system for this distribu-
tion is dm-crypt [3]. Our evaluation of dm-crypt confirmed
that it fulfills all of our requirements, listed below:
– widely used and well-documented solution,
– open-source (or, with a friendly license),
– capable of full system encryption,
– easy to use in scripts,
– using standard format for encrypted volume
(LUKS [4]),
– using a state-of-the-art encryption algorithm (AES).
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Other solutions, namely, TrueCrypt [5] or eCryptfs [6],
were also an option, although we rejected them as an un-
necessary complication.
The dm-crypt (device mapper crypto target) pack-
age provides transparent encryption and decryption
of block devices. It creates a logical device (e.g.,
/dev/mapper/sda2crypt) for each file or partition (e.g.,
/dev/sda2) we would like to encrypt. Reading from such
a logical device involves a decryption operation performed
in a background, while writing data through the device re-
sults in data encryption.
4. The Actual Problem: Secure Logon
In order to decrypt the drive, we need to pass a password
(or, a key) to drive encryption software. Of course, as
the password cannot be stored within the workstation (at
least, in a plain form; but if it is encrypted, then we need
a password-to-password), it must be entered by a user dur-
ing workstation startup. This leads to an important ques-
tion whether the workstation’s environment can be trusted –
that no malware is waiting to intercept the password (and
store it somewhere for further retrieval, as in the evil maid
case [7], [8]).
As one can see, for our secure workstation, we only selected
an existing encryption package and had no plans to develop
dedicated software, nor modify the selected one. However,
the actual problem we face here is how a user could securely
provide the password, or, how we could assure that the
workstation has not been modified in any way. That is to
say, we need to assure a secure logon. Or, we require the
workstation to authenticate itself to a user before a user
authenticates in the workstation [8].
The above mentioned evil maid attack is less likely in
a secure (physically protected) external environment, where
a workstation is intended to be installed and used. However,
as we have mentioned previously, our project also consid-
ers a “mobile workstation” in the form of a laptop, and is
trying to deliver a flexible solution for both cases.
5. Requirements
Drive encryption, correlated with secure logon, should
fulfill a number of requirements. Some of them are more
obvious, and some sound less apparent. The paramount
requirements are as follows:
– efficient and effective data encryption, resistant to
crypto attacks;
– workstation configuration (virtual machines and
users) protected from disclosure;
– workstation environment (both software and data)
shielded from tampering.
Additional, less apparent requirements are listed below:
– authentication of the workstation to a user: the work-
station should convince the user that its environment
is original and untampered;
– authentication of a user in the workstation, prefer-
ably, involving additional hardware and/or biometric
elements;
– support for multi-access: we assume a number of
user accounts, even in the case of a laptop;
– effective means to limit access to virtual machines
for users that have no accounts there;
– easy and effective means to withdraw a user’s access
to the workstation.
The scope of encryption includes the whole hard drive
without the content of /boot directory of the host system
(domain 0). This directory contains the boot image, the
initial file system (initramfs [9]) and user account data,
packed and encrypted as a single blob file (refer to the next
Section for details).
6. The Boot Process Step-By-Step
During the boot process, a number of software pieces are
executed in a sequence (or, a chain). The boot may be con-
sidered secure if all the pieces are original (not modified
by an attacker). To ensure this, every executing element
measures its successor in the chain before passing the con-
trol to it, and writes the measurement to a Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM [10]) register. The first element in the
chain, the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) is
a hardware-protected boot block code (e.g., the BIOS boot
block code). The CRTM is considered trustworthy. The
last element in our case is initramfs, measured by a boot-
loader. If all the measured values are correct and match the
values of the data the TPM has sealed – i.e., when worksta-
tion boot software has been prepared and configured [11],
the TPM enters the desired state and is able to perform
cryptographic operations.
Before we proceed, we describe the content of a USB stick,
which acts as a hardware key, and is prepared for each
user during account creation. A BESTSTICK (BEST is an
acronym from the Polish title of the project) contains four
files, residing in an archive encrypted by the TPM:
– login: the file contains the user name;
– password: this is the random part of a pass-
word (to password, see below), generated using the
/dev/random device; note that /dev/random, un-
like the /dev/urandom pseudo-random device, may
be considered as a true random generator, as it uses
environmental “noise” (e.g., mouse movements or
keyboard strokes);
– phrase: this is the authentication phrase;
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– image: this file contains the authentication image,
also selected by a user during the account creation.
In practice, the image should be copied from another
portable storage medium during the stick preparation.
The boot process, after initramfs has been loaded and the
control passed to its main executable – /init, proceeds in
the following steps:
1. A RAM drive is created and mounted. All further
file operations are performed using the RAM drive.
2. A user’s BESTSTICK is mounted and the archive it
contains is copied to the RAM drive.
3. The archive is decrypted using the TPM, and the in-
dividual files are extracted. The stick is no more
needed, so it is unmounted.
Note that the TPM will switch to the desired state
only if the workstation boot software chain (from
CRTM to initramfs) has not been modified (also
assuming that the software is bug-free). Otherwise,
the attempt to unseal (decrypt) the secret will fail and
the subsequent steps will not execute.
4. Now, the splash screen (plymouth [12]) is config-
ured to display the phrase and picture, and the user
is asked for his part of drive encryption password
(userpass) – see Fig. 1.
5. The file containing encrypted password to the drive,
username.dom0.aes, is extracted from the en-
crypted archive /boot/best/users; again, the
TPM chip performs the decryption.
6. The file username.dom0.aes is decrypted using the
AES algorithm, with a password composed of two
parts – the random part and the user-provided part:
(userpass || password).
7. The password to the hard drive is passed to
cryptsetup; the RAM drive’s content is overwritten
with zero bytes, and then gets unmounted.
8. The user can log in to the workstation.
Fig. 1. The login screen (the phrase is visible after switching to
console view).
In case of a “virgin” run (with no configured users), the
above procedure is skipped and a special script is executed
that allows to create the first (administrator) account.
The main components of the process are summarized in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Key components of the login process.
The process is executed by quite a large number of shell
scripts. Most of them are embedded into initramfs (we
use dracut [13] to automate initramfs generation).
Some additional scripts perform administrative tasks (e.g.,
create a new user account and configure a USB stick, etc.),
some are used for testing. Additional software installed on
the workstation included TrustedGRUB [14] (the GRUB
bootloader with TPM support), and two packages provid-
ing access to TPM: TrouSerS [15] and tpm-tools.
Note that the final effect we have reached is not completely
satisfying. It is quite difficult to manage the display of
the picture (a large picture happens to partially cover the
password area, which looks bad). Also, we would prefer
the phrase to be shown directly on the login screen. Un-
fortunately, while it was possible to modify and recompile
plymouth code, we failed, for an unknown reason, to make
it work after re-installation. Perhaps it requires some spe-
cific approach at some step.
7. Drive Encryption Revisited
We performed a broad set of tests to assess the efficiency
of drive encryption of our Seagate Constellation 1000 GB
HDD drive. A few jumbo files and a lot of small files were
copied between encrypted and unencrypted partitions. The
tests required some care as the system “cheats” by caching
data read from the drive (for example, we rebooted the sys-
tem often enough to prevent this behavior). Also, during
the experiments we observed that the physical location on
the drive where data are read from (or, written to) signifi-
cantly influences performance, probably due to differences
in drive access times. Moreover, these times often domi-
nate the encryption. As a result, we can issue a conclu-
sion that, while the overhead of encryption is difficult to
measure precisely, it is quite small and does not lead to
a negative user experience. We also performed tests for
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a double encryption case, assuming that virtual domains
may use additional encryption – see Section 8. This time,
the performance degradation was observable but the overall
system performance was still regarded as acceptable.
8. Security Assessment
In this Section, we assess the security of our architecture –
the strong and weaker points and possible improvements.
Note that we generally assume the worse usage scenario of
a laptop stored and used in a (potentially) insecure envi-
ronment.
CRTM and TPM. First, we rely on the Core Root of
Trust Management and the Trusted Platform Module – that
the whole boot process could be trusted. While some
first successful attacks on TPM have been reported [16],
they are enormously time- and resource-consuming (one
could argue that with sufficient time and unlimited technical
means every security mechanism could be compromised),
and it seems we can assume that boot elements are secure
enough.
At the same time, we assume the whole boot software
chain is correct and immune to attacks (such as buffer over-
flows). Otherwise, an attacker could modify its behavior
to prepare subsequent hostile actions while supplying orig-
inal hash values to the TPM.
Phrase. This is an additional and quite a weak mechanism
as the phrase could be intercepted relatively easily (e.g.,
by a hidden camera in a hotel room). Having said that,
we can add that the mechanism could be augmented using
a set of phrases, with a user selecting a phrase to display
using some identifier (a phrase number or a few first letters).
Assuming the user is careful enough and changes phrases
during subsequent logins, the mechanism would be greatly
strengthened.
Picture. At present, we assume it is much more difficult
to “steal” the picture (e.g., with a precise photo). Unfortu-
nately, even an imperfectly copied picture could suffice if
the user is not careful enough (he might not notice some
subtle differences at the pixel level). As above, a set of
pictures could be employed to make an attack harder to
prepare.
Password typing. A simple attack could be performed us-
ing a hidden camera in order to observe the password dur-
ing typing. For increased security, if a user is able to type
without looking at the keyboard, some form of a keyboard
cover would prevent the snooping.
Hardware key (USB stick). The key must not be kept to-
gether with the workstation. The secrets (phrases and pic-
tures) used for the workstation to authenticate itself to a user
are decrypted automatically at startup, so they are revealed
to any user, legitimate or not, who is powering the work-
station with the hardware key present. There could be an
additional (preliminary) password applied to decrypt the
stick’s content (together with TPM, of course – that is, both
the preliminary password and TPM would be necessary to
decrypt the stick). This would yield increased security at
the cost of increased complexity of the login process.
Also, a plain USB stick may easily be copied (without
leaving any trace), which also constitutes a security hole.
Thus, we consider a smart card as a replacement for the
stick.
Biometrics. Most modern laptops are already equipped
with some sort of biometry device (e.g., fingerprint scan-
ner), which would help in user identification.
Access withdrawal. This is relatively easy, as it is
sufficient to remove a user’s account by deleting the
username.dom0.aes file (containing the encrypted pass-
word to domain 0). Even if a user refuses to return the
USB stick (or, makes a copy of it), there is no way the
user can log in to the workstation, and the stick becomes
unusable.
Workstation configuration: users. User accounts (their
presence and number) are protected; their data are en-
crypted.
Workstation configuration: virtual domains. Domains
could be stored either as files within the encrypted file sys-
tem, or using separate (encrypted) partitions (see the next
paragraph). In the latter case, it seems that the number of
domains could be observed but, having a sufficiently capa-
cious hard drive, one could configure a large (sufficient in
all scenarios plus some spare ones) number of partitions;
some of them would be used by actual virtual domains,
while other would contain random data. In this way, the
presence and the number of domains would be concealed.
However, this is not the full story yet: An attacker could
observe changes in raw data and infer which partitions are
used and which lie dormant, so some additional effort (al-
tering the bytes from time to time) would be necessary.
Virtual domains encryption. Although our proposal con-
cerns logging to domain 0, we assume that user domains
Fig. 3. Virtual domains as files within domain 0 (left) or separate
drive partitions (right).
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will be additionally encrypted, each using a separate pass-
word. The reason is that in case a malicious user (or,
a malware that infected one of his virtual machines) is able
to successfully break into domain 0, he will not be able
to immediately attack inactive domains (lying dormant on
the drive), as he does not know the decryption password.
This is not a perfect protection mechanism (the attacker
could install password interception malware), but it makes
the attack on the other domains harder and more time-con-
suming.
We consider two possible approaches. The virtual domains
may reside in files within the domain 0, or be stored in
separate disk partitions (see Fig. 3).
Summary. As we have shown above, the logon process of-
fers a reasonable level of security. This level could be in-
creased by some additional mechanisms (multiple phrases,
additional password, etc.). However, this also results in in-
creased complexity. As [17] demonstrates, a user (human
being) is the weak point; if a user finds the login process as
unacceptably complex, he will also discover a way to sim-
plify it in a way that definitely will also relax the security.
Thus a sensible compromise must be found.
For an in-depth discussion of security of a system with
encrypted drive in the context of the evil maid attack, pos-
sible prevention methods and ways to bypass them, refer
to [7], [8], [18].
9. Related Work
The work [8], [19] concerns the same problem. We learned
a lot from that work (especially the discussion of possible
attacks), although technically our solution is different and
offers some additional features required in our project –
with multi-access (support for multiple user accounts) being
probably the most important issue. In our case, the stick
is not bootable; it serves for authentication purposes only.
Other differences between [8], [19] and our solution are
listed in Table 1. Note that by showing the comparison, we
are not going to argue that our work is better in some way.
We believe that it should be treated as a sort of continuation,
and the table is presented for a reader’s convenience.
Table 1
Comparison of features between [8] and our work
Anti-evil maid Our solution
Location of system
stick stick
authentication data
System authentication data phrase
phrase
and picture
Ability to use SRK password yes no
Part of the disk password
no yes
on the stick
Part of the password
no yes
stored locally
Location of the boot files
stick hard drive
(kernel, initramfs, . . . )
10. Future Work
The main issues we would like to take into account in future
involve the application of smart cards (as a replacement
for the current USB sticks) and experiments with on-board
biometric devices (in laptops). Also, we would like to
make yet another attempt to modify plymouth and make
it display both phrase and picture in a neat way.
11. Conclusions
In the paper, we have presented our proposal to implement
a secure login to a Linux-based workstation with an en-
crypted hard drive. We believe it offers a reasonably high
level of security; this level may additionally be increased
at the cost of making things more complex (and, probably,
less tolerated by a user). As a final remark we would like to
note that our work remains valid also for a non-virtualized
Linux system.
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